



















The automotive sector in Mexico 
 















1 *Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, Mexico  
E-mail:  jcarreto@economia.unam.mx 
 
ISSN: 2281-440X online 





The automotive sector in Mexico 













This paper contextualises the background of a broader research on the digital technological transfor-
mation in the automotive industry in Mexico. It explores the impact of the NAFTA in the development 
of automotive industry in Mexico and how this country has become an important player in the global 
value chains of the automotive industry. This will provide the ongoing research project on "Digital 
transformation in the automotive supply chain in Mexico" with insights of what could be the impact of 
the new trade agreement with US and Canada, as well as its effects inside the country and its cross-
country impact on the automotive global value chain. 
The paper describes briefly the situation of the automotive industry before the NAFTA was signed, in 
1992, and the development in Mexico during the validity of Agreement. The automotive industry has 
become the second most important industry in Mexico, after food industries. In 2015 it represented 
18.5% of manufacturing GDP, and it exports most of its production to the United States. In 2018, Mex-
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The paper is a contribution on the automotive sector in Mexico before and after NAFTA, prepared for the research 
team “Digital transformation in the automotive supply chain. The case of Mexico” of Jorge Carreto Sanginés 
(UNAM, Mexico), Margherita Russo (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Italy) and Annamaria Simonazzi 
(La Sapienza Roma, Italy)  
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The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
In 1992, when the governments of the US, Canada and Mexico were negotiating the proposed 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)1, there were mainly two positions: the first 
argued that a NAFTA would mean increased prosperity for the US and Mexico; the second 
held that it would lead to ruthless economic competition based on low wages and hence stag-
nant productivity on both sides of the border. 
Before the NAFTA was established, policy makers were convinced that the key to success in 
managing the social and economic transformations that the Agreement would bring about, was 
to build new institutions that could set a framework for public and private choices – the kind 
of choices taken by employers, workers and government officials. Decision making process in 
the first half of the twentieth century was determined by prevailing macroeconomic policies 
that gave the government the responsibility to provide welfare for workers and their families 
(the New Deal), and by the prevalence of mass production, when labour and management set-
tled upon difficult trade union negotiations. 
The development of Mexican economy in the three decades after WWII was characterised by 
a progressive decline in the capacity to generate enough exports to finance the imports required 
for economic growth. The protection of domestic market through tariffs and imports controls 
did not stimulate productivity and innovation, and local currency was overvalued. Local pro-
duction aimed to substitute the goods that were imported was a policy priority that provoked 
an increase in inflation. The efforts to substitute imports of durable goods caused an increase 
in inputs imports and the absence of a government policy to promote productive efficiency and 
exports lowered profits in the industries supplying external markets. The overvaluation of the 
peso contributed to this decline in profits. 
The continuing deficit in trade balance forced the opening of Mexican economy and Mexico 
entered the GATT in 1986. This was the end of an era that based development on the industri-
alisation and Mexico became an export-oriented economy. The rise to power of economists 
educated in the United States, who favoured free market ideology and were convinced that this 
was the right course to development, marked a turn in Mexican policy stance, more in accord-
ance with American positions. The opening of Mexican economy culminated with the NAFTA, 
which was intended, on the Mexican side, mainly to promote foreign investments. The NAFTA 
created social strains due to the lack of alternatives for the less educated workers with lower 
income, but the institutions and policies needed to tackle these problems were not created or 
were not suited for the task.  
What was the outcome, twenty-five years after the NAFTA started? Did the open trade increase 
prosperity and raise standards of living in both countries? Or did it bring out the worst in each, 
driving down wages and living standards in the United States without accelerating development 
in Mexico?  
 
1 The United States commenced bilateral trade negotiations with Canada more than 30 years ago, resulting in the 
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force on January 1, 1989. In 1991, bilateral talks 
began with Mexico, which Canada joined. The NAFTA followed, entering into force on January 1, 1994. 
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The automotive industry provides a very good sample to verify the actual outcome of the 
NAFTA.  
The automotive supply chain in Mexico before NAFTA 
Assemblers, parts suppliers, labour 
Before the NAFTA, there was a highly integrated U.S.-Canadian automotive industry consist-
ing of a pyramid where assemblers were at the top – designing, developing, assembling, mar-
keting and distributing vehicles – and the supply chain was organised in several lower tiers of 
internal and captive suppliers and independent suppliers. This, while in Mexico there were five 
major firms competing in a historically regulated market almost entirely closed to imports. 
Mexican owned supply industry was largely uncompetitive and the maquiladoras2 were fo-
cused on labour-intensive items. The development of the automobile industry in Mexico re-
sulted from government policies that forced companies to carry out some parts of the manu-
facturing process within the country in order to be allowed to sell their production in Mexico. 
The major firms present at the time were General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Nissan and 
Volkswagen (see Table 1). They viewed their investment in Mexico as the price of admission 
to the country’s market. Sales here were too low to support efficient plants and companies 
preferred to supply it through imports; they operated with profit only because of existing trade 
barriers. According to data provided by the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment 
(OTA)3, production of cars and trucks in Mexico before NAFTA (1992) was of 970,000 units. 
  
 
2 Maquiladoras are companies that carry out partial manufacturing, assembly or packaging of some merchandise 
without being the original manufacturers (OEM). Maquiladoras transform foreign produced items that are im-
ported only for this purpose and are immediately exported to be integrated to the original supply chain or sold 
in the US market. 
3 The Office for Technology Assessment was created in 1972 by the Congress “as an aid in the identification 
and consideration, as well as to provide early indications of the probable beneficial and adverse impacts of the 
applications of technology and to develop other coordinate information which may assist the Congress”. Con-
sidered an "unnecessary agency" that duplicated government work done elsewhere, the agency was closed in 
1995. 
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Cuautitlán   
cars 60,000 Mexico 
trucks 50,000 Mexico 
Hermosillo (cars) 160,000 US & Canada 
General Motors 
Ramos Arizpe (cars) 100,000 Mexico, US & Canada 
Mexico City (trucks) 60,000 Mexico 
Chrysler 
Toluca (cars) 120,000 Mexico, US & Canada 
Mexico City (trucks, some cars) 75,000 Mexico, US & Canada 
Nissan 
Cuernavaca   
cars 80,000 Mexico, Spain, Latin America 
trucks 50,000 Mexico, Spain, Latin America 
Volkswagen 
Puebla   
cars 200,000 Mexico, US & Canada 
trucks 15,000 Mexico, US & Canada 
Source: Office for Technology Assessment (OTA), 1992 
According to the Asociación Mexicana de la Industria Automotriz (AMIA, 2018), production 
of light vehicles for domestic sales has in fact diminished while production for exports has 
grown from 277 thousand units in 1990 to 3.9 million in 2018. Mexico has become a key 
platform for global companies to produce for export to the United States.  










exports as % of 
total 
sales in Mx 
% of total 
1981 585  14  571  2.4% 97.6% 
1985  49  58  91  12.9% 87.1% 
1990  804  277  527  34.4% 65.6% 
1995 931  781  150  83.9% 16.1% 
2000  1,889  1,434  455  75.9% 24.1% 
2005 1,606  1,186  420  73.8% 26.2% 
2010  2,261  1,860  401  82.3% 17.7% 
2015  3,399  2,759  640  81.2% 18.8% 
2018 3,908   3,449  459  88.3% 11.7% 
Source: 1981 through 1987, data from Office for Technology Assessment, 1992; 1988 through 2018, data from 
Asociación Mexicana de industria automotriz (AMIA)  
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Figure 1. Production of light vehicles in Mexico. 
 
Source: Asociación Mexicana de la Industria Automotriz, ww3.amia.com.mx/archivos/1218.zip 
Mexico’s auto decrees: 1925-1989 
In 1947, an auto decree was issued which imposed quotas on the import of parts to assembly 
plants. No more than 20% of parts content came from Mexican suppliers. There were 12 as-
sembly plants in 1960 but industry’s annual output never exceeded about 60,000 cars (Office 
for Technology Assessment, 1992; Klier and Rubinstein, 2017). 
The 1962 decree called for import substitution; 60% of production should be domestic content. 
Powertrains (engines, transmissions) had to be made in Mexico. Foreign firms could continue 
to own assembly and engine plants but were limited to minority shares in parts producers. 
Imports of finished vehicles were prohibited. Output was below capacity of a single efficient 
assembly plant; cost and prices were high, and many parts were still imported, thus causing a 
trade deficit in motor vehicle sector. Import substitution stimulated the construction of new 
assembly plants: Ford at Cuautitlán, State of Mexico, Chrysler at Toluca in 1968, Volkswagen 
in Puebla in 1965 and Nissan in Cuernavaca in 1966. Other assemblers stopped assembling and 
selling vehicles in Mexico. 
In 1969, 1972 and 1977, additional requirements to export in proportion to production for sale 
in Mexico were established. Still, trade deficit didn’t get better. 
In 1982, economic crisis caused a plunge in domestic demand. A new decree followed in 1983, 
focus was on export promotion. New assembly and engine manufacturing plants were built by 
automakers and production in maquiladora plants increased.  
In 1989, following Mexico adhering to GATT, there was some liberalisation of Mexican rules 
on the auto industry national value-added requirement and on the native ownership requirement 
of 51% of companies. A decree was issued allowing 100% foreign owned parts plants produc-
ing for export and 40% ownership of suppliers for Mexican market. The decree permitted im-
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from Mexico exceeded that of its imports. Mexican firms (60% Mexican owned) had to provide 
36% of the value of components used in vehicles sold within Mexico and assemblers were to 
maintain a positive balance of trade.  
Maquiladoras boomed in the 1980s, after the peso collapsed in 1982. The Border Industriali-
zation Program (BIP) that allowed maquiladora plants since 1965, was taken full advantage of 
by automotive companies in the 1980s when low labour costs attracted new businesses: in 1980 
there were 53 automotive maquiladora plants, 187 in 1990 and 313 in 2006 (Klier and Rubin-
stein 2017). In 1990, the PITEX (Temporary Import to Produce Export Articles Program) al-
lowed companies to sell most of their production in Mexico with tariff relief. In 2006, finally, 
both the maquiladora and the PITEX programs were merged into a single one called IMMEX 
(Manufacturing, Maquiladora and Export Services Industry) (ibidem). 
Finished cars and light trucks could be imported starting 1991 – 15% of market share in 1991 
and 1992, 20% in 1993. Exports were to counterbalance imports 2.5:1 ratio in 1991, 2:1 in 
1992 and 1993, and 1.75:1 in 1994. A 15% tariff was imposed on imported vehicles, 13.2% on 
parts. 
Mexican parts and components industry 
In 1992, the parts industry in Mexico was divided into plants that produced exclusively or 
mainly for the Mexican market, and maquiladoras, that produced parts for export. Total auto 
parts market in Mexico amounted to nearly US$11.9 billion in 1990 (Office for Technology 
Assessment, 1992). 27% were purchases by assemblers (OEMs) from Mexican suppliers, 24% 
imported parts and 5% captive (self-supplied) production. Another 3% was consumed by 
maquiladora component plants purchased from Mexican suppliers and 8% were imported parts. 
Aftermarket sales produced by Mexican suppliers amounted 21% of total auto parts market and 
8% to imported parts. 
Mexican major suppliers were mainly companies born through strategic alliances with some of 
the major auto parts US manufacturers (Table 3). 
Table 3 - Mexican Major Auto Parts Manufacturers and their Strategic Alliances 
Firm 1990 sales  
(millions of dollars) 
Main products Partners 
Spicer 480 
engine parts, clutches, transmissions, axles, 
universal joints, gaskets, electrical parts 
Dana, Kelsey-Hayes, GKN, 
Perfect Circle, TRW, many 
others 
Vitro Crinamex 256 Auto glass   
ICA Autopartes 250 Manual transmissions, clutches, brakes Clark, Budd, Borg Warner 
Condumex 170 
wiring harnesses, shock absorbers, pistons, 
piston rings 
Sealed Power, Packard Elec-
tric, Maremont 
Proez/Metalsa 120 Stampings, chassis parts 
A.O. Smith, Solvay Auto-
motive 
Grupo Rassini 100 Springs, seats and upholstery NHK, Lear Seating 
Grupo Tebo 80 iron castings Teksid 
Nemak 71 Aluminium castings Ford, Teksid 
Source: Office for Technology Assessment, 1992 
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U.S.-owned Assembly Plants and Transplants4 Before NAFTA 
At the beginning of the 1990s, U.S. automakers were losing money on their North American 
operations due to low capacity operation. In 1991, the Big Three averaged 63% of capacity 
usage while production facilities needed at least 85% to become profitable. In general, trans-
plants operated at an estimated 67% of capacity and expected to increase capacity usage. This 
meant that US automakers were to continue losing money while Japanese firms, although mak-
ing losses too, would improve their relative positions (Office for Technology Assessment, 
1992). 
U.S. parts suppliers were in trouble as well: imports from Japan were increasing, mostly being 
directed towards transplant assemblers who imported an estimated 52% of the value of com-
ponents for their vehicles; another 48% was sourced internally from transplant suppliers and 
from independent U.S. parts suppliers. Japanese-owned parts firms followed their customers 
to the U.S. and, in 1992, operated nearly 300 plants in the United States and in Canada. Pur-
chases from other plants was straightforward, with low-valued-added parts from independent 
U.S. suppliers, for example, gaskets and hoses, not gears and bearings. 
In 1990, Japan’s automakers earned, as an average, about $1,300 on each car sold in their home 
market, and lost around $1,100 per vehicle sold in the U.S. During the 1980s, U.S. policies 
aimed at limiting imports were enacted; transplants and joint venture operations opened in re-
sponse to these policies increasing North American assembly capacity. New plants with high 
levels of productivity and quality placed pressure on older U.S.-owned facilities. Transplants 
had cost advantages in manufacturing up to $1,000 per car, while productivity accounted for 
less than $200. There were other factors, like incentive packages provided by the State and 
local governments to attract transplants, and the fact that the new, young workforce employed 
by transplants implied lower pension and health care costs. 
  
 
4 The U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment used the term “transplant” referring to Japanese companies 
transferring production from their home country to the U.S.) "Transplant: a plant built in the United States by a 
foreign manufacturer to serve the U.S. market, often to substitute for exports that had previously been shipped 
to the United States." Office for Technology Assessment OTA, 1992 
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United States Canada Mexico Total 
Big Three 
General Motors 16 2 1 19 
Ford 7 2 2 11 
Chrysler 4 1 1 6 
Wholly owned transplants     
Honda 2 1  3 
Nissan 1  1 2 
Toyota 1 1  2 
Hyundai  1  1 
Mitsubishi (a) 1   1 
Volkswagen   1 1 
Volvo  1  1 
Joint-Venture Transplants     
CAMI (GM-Suzuki)  1  1 
Mazda (b) 1   1 
NUMMI (GM-Toyota) (c) 1   1 
Subaru-Isuzu 1   1 
Total 35 10 6 51 
(a) joint venture with Chrysler dissolved in October 1991 
(b) Ford purchased 50% share in 1992 
(c) Dissolved in 1996 
Source: Office for Technology Assessment, 1992. 
Japanese owned transplants payed lower wages than U.S. suppliers and also had lower benefit 
expenses since they employed younger workers. They had no retired employees to support and 
had to pay lower medical insurance than the Big Three did.  
Table 5 - Comparative Wage and Benefit Levels in the United States, 1986 
 
Average hourly wage Total compensation including benefits 
$ Index $ Index 
Big Three assembly and in-house parts 15.00 100.0 22.50 100.0 
Transplant assembly 15.00 100.0 17.5 77.8 
Parts     
Independent U.S. suppliers 10.40 69.3 13.00 57.8 
Transplant suppliers 8.00 53.3 10.00 44.4 
Source: Office for Technology Assessment, 1992 
The problem for U.S. parts suppliers was greater than for assemblers. Imports from Japan had 
been increasing and the majority of them went to transplant assemblers, which imported nearly 
52% (by value) of the components in the vehicles they produced. Other 48% was sourced in-
ternally, from transplant suppliers and from independent U.S. parts suppliers.  
Japanese-owned parts firms integrated into a keiretsu, followed their customers and operated 
about 300 plants in the U.S. and Canada in 1992 (OTA, 1992). 
Mounting pressure on the traditional supplier base in the U.S. led to the closure of unionized 
plants, investments in low-wage southern states and relocation to Mexico. The factors that led 
assemblers to decide whether to source from nearby plants or relocated plants were: “just-in-
11 
time” (JIT) delivery, transportation costs, economies of scale, currency exchange risks, politi-
cal factors, labour costs and workforce capabilities, regulatory requirements. 
According to the Office for Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress estimates (1992), at 
least $500 million were needed in 1991 to build and equip a new assembly plant in Mexico, 
capable of producing 250,000 cars each year; more than that if stamping facilities were in-
cluded. It took three years for construction and start-up, according to the same estimates. La-
bour costs amounted to roughly 10% of components costs and shipping costs were about 1% 
in the U.S. while they were 7.5% in Mexico ($75 in the U.S. vs. $600 in Mexico). Shipping 
costs could be reduced about one third if the plant in Mexico did its own stamping, because 
sheet metal parts are difficult to handle and easily damaged in transit. This meant that cheap 
labour didn’t provide enough incentive to build a new assembly plant in Mexico, unless a con-
siderable proportion of the output was sold either in Mexico or in Central and South America. 
Table 6 - Cost Structure for Auto Assembly in the United States and Mexico, 1992 
 United States Mexico 
 $ % $ % 
Labour 700 7.98 140 1.53 
Parts, components, subassemblies 7,750 88.37 8,000 87.15 
Component shipping costs 75 0.86 600 6.54 
Finished vehicle shipping 225 2.57 400 4.36 
Inventory costs 20 0.23 40 0.44 
 8,770 100.00 9,180 100.00 
Source: OTA, 1992 
Producing engines in Mexico was feasible because they were easy to ship, components could 
be brought from outside Mexico because parts, like pistons and valves, had low shipping costs 
relative to their value and Mexico had several foundries capable of producing complex castings 
at competitive costs and quality levels. Engine production was, at the time, high in value-added 
but not in labour intensity – a plant employed around a thousand people, about a third than a 
vehicle assembly plant. In 1991, it was estimated that a plant producing engines with an annual 
capacity of 400,000 to 450,000 engines would cost around $700 million to build, nearly as an 
assembly plant. 
Part production was controlled by auto makers either through internal production or by sub-
contracting to trusted suppliers, seeking to keep this production close to assembling facilities. 
Since economies of scale and proprietary technology were important, Mexican suppliers 
weren’t competitive enough. Maquiladoras could compete in sectors like wiring harness as-
sembly, airbags and cut-and-sew operations on seats, since these were labour intensive, diffi-
cult to automate; the sort of work that could be performed by low-skilled labour with scarce 
training. Production went to Mexico because of low labour costs. In 1980, there were less than 
10,000 employed in maquiladora parts production; by 1990 there were 100,000 and 130,000 in 
1991. 
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The automotive supply chain in Mexico during the NAFTA 
NAFTA: expected outcomes 
NAFTA was expected to affect U.S. jobs and job opportunities in two ways: 
‒ Mexico would relax its trade balancing and local content rules, and U.S. companies 
would increase exports of vehicles and parts to Mexico, saving jobs in the U.S. while 
Mexican market expanded as a result of the treaty. 
‒ It was expected that NAFTA influenced business strategy and wage setting in the inde-
pendent parts sector: increased investments in Mexico by first-tier U.S. and Asian sup-
pliers and plant relocations by lower tier U.S. suppliers looking for low wage strategies 
would mean increased competition for suppliers remaining in the U.S., pressing down-
wards wages. 
The NAFTA became effective in 1993. Since that date until 2017, Mexico’s gross domestic 
product has grown (measured in constant pesos) at an average annual rate of 2.46%. During 
the first years, from 1993 to 2000, this annual rate averaged 3.5%. From 2000 to 2008, the 
annual average rate was only 1.88% and from 2008 to 2006, the average annual rate was 2.14%. 
Undoubtedly, these rates were too low with respect to the expectations raised when the treaty 
was proposed (OTA, 1992). Figure 2 compares the rate of growth of GDP and GDP per capita 
in terms of purchasing power parity international dollars. 
Figure 2. Annual rate of growth of GDP. PPP; international dollars (red columns) 
GDP per capita. PPP; 2011 international dollar (green line) 
 
Source: IMF. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/ 
NAFTA proponents argued, back in 1992, that there were two factors that would have influ-
enced the economic results of the treaty: the allocative efficiency factor and the scale econo-
mies factor. The allocative efficiency factor was to benefit both the United States and Mexico 
because, due to the difference in stocks of capital and labour between them, the United States 
would have specialized in the production of capital-intensive goods, while Mexico would have 





















































































































country had produced both types of goods internally. The scale economies factor was to permit 
cost reductions due to the larger and more integrated market.  
It was of great relevance whether Mexico and the U.S. were to follow a higher productivity 
and human resource intensive path or if it would become a low-productivity development path. 
In fact, what actually seems to have happened is that the path followed was one of wage com-
petition eroding wages, which lagged behind productivity growth, reduced workers’ purchas-
ing power and created unemployment. The fact that wages remained low resulted in reduced 
aggregate demand rather than reduced unemployment. 
Auto production under NAFTA 
During the 25 years since NAFTA was signed, manufacturing activities have diminished as a 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product, despite the powerful growth of automotive industry. 
The automotive industry has become the second most important industry in Mexico, after food 
industry. In 2015 it represented 18.5% of manufacturing GDP. Most of its production is ex-
ported to the United States. 
Figure 3 - Manufacturing activities as a percentage of GNP, Mexico, 1993-2017 
  
Source: www.inegi.org.mx 
Table 7 – Most important industries in the manufacturing sector as a percentage of the GDP in the manu-
facturing sector, 1993-2015, at current prices 
Industries 1993 2000 2005 2014 2015 
Food  24.1 20.2 22.7 23.6 22.6 
Automotive  11.2 13.5 12.1 16.9 18.5 
Chemical 9.4 11.1 12.6 11.6 8.8 
Basic metal 3.3 4.5 6.4 5.8 5.3 
Beverage and tobacco 4.5 4.7 5.5 5.1 5.1 
Total of most important industries 52.5 54.0 59.3 63.0 60.3 
GDP in the manufacturing sector 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: INEGI, Mexican System of national Accounts 
The industrial system in Mexico has a dual character: on one side there is an important presence 
of big, high technology industrial companies, mainly owned by foreign capital and, on the other 
side, there is a great number of small and medium sized firms, unable to catch up with the 
constantly advancing international competition. These SMEs lack highly trained professional 
personnel and access to affordable credit.  
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While manufacturing activities as a percentage of GNP remained stagnant, automobile manu-
facture grew to nearly 4% of Mexican GNP. In fact, auto production has more than doubled its 
participation in manufacturing in Mexico since 1993.  
Figure 4 - Auto production in Mexico, 1993-2017 (percentage of GNP indicated over the columns) 
 
Source: www.inegi.org.mx 
The number of manufacturing companies in Mexico has grown from 328,718 in 2004 to 
489,530 in 2014, that is, at a 4.06% annual average rate, nearly 49% in 10 years; the number 
of companies manufacturing transport equipment (branch 336 of NAS Mx*) has grown from 
1,978 in 2004 to 2,392 in 2014 – 1.9% annual average rate, 21% in 10 years (INEGI. National 
Institute for Statistics and Geography).  
Figure 5 - Auto production as a percentage of manufacturing production - MEXICO 
 
Source: inegi.org.mx. NAS Mx – National Account System Mexico 
 
While in 2004, transport equipment economic units represented only 0.6% of all manufacturing 
industry and 0.49% in 2014, the value of transport equipment production represented 12.3% of 
all manufacturing production in 2004, and it jumped up to 22% in 2017. As a percentage of 



































































Figure 6 - Total production of light vehicles in Mexico, by car maker 2005-2017 (units) 
 
Source: AMIA, data as of sept. 2018. data in Table 7 
Total production (in units) of light vehicles has grown 244% - at an average rate of 7.7% - 
between 2005 and 2017. Nissan was the greatest producer in 2017 - 21% of total production - 
followed by General Motors (20.5%). In the same period, GNP grew at an average annual rate 
of 2.36%. 
Table 8 - Annual average rate of growth of total production of light vehicles in Mexico, by car maker, 2005-
2010, 2010-2017, 2005-2017 
 annual average rate of growth 
  2005-2010 2010-2017 2005-2017 
FCA MEXICO -5.60% 13.90% 5.30% 
FORD MOTOR 21.70% -3.10% 6.50% 
GENERAL MOTORS 5.50% 5.40% 5.40% 
HONDA 18.50% 21% 20% 
KIA   106% 
MAZDA   11.50% 
NISSAN 7.70% 7.30% 7.50% 
RENAULT -82.90% -100% -100% 
TOYOTA 13.10% 15.70% 14.80% 
VOLKSWAGEN 7.70% 0.90% 3.60% 
Total 7.10% 8.20% 7.70% 


















Figure 7. Annual average rate of growth for the main OEMs present in Mexico 
 
Source: AMIA, data as of sept. 2018; * Data for Kia, Mazda and Renault is not included in the graph 
Domestic consumption and exports 
Mexico’s domestic consumption absorbs less than 20 per cent of the vehicles it manufactures 
while in Canada only 12 percent of the vehicles it manufactures are for domestic consumption. 
NAFTA light vehicle capacity is projected to grow from 19.3 million units of capacity in 2016 
to just over 22.5 million units by 2023. This, while U.S. capacity is forecast to grow by nearly 
11 percent between 2016 and 2023, Canadian capacity will remain flat, and the majority of the 
growth will happen in Mexico, where light vehicle capacity will grow by 45 percent (Source: 
LMC Automotive). Exports from the U.S., Canada, and Mexico to non-NAFTA countries are 
projected to grow (Dziczek et.al., 2016). 
Production of light vehicles in Mexico is aimed mainly for export. While in 1988, before 
NAFTA, 505,2 thousand units were produced in Mexico, of which 67% was sold within the 
country, in 2018 3.9 million units were produced and 3.4 million units (88.3%) were exported. 
Sales in Mexican market have lagged behind exports: while in 1988, total domestic sales of 
vehicles manufactured in Mexico were 339,132 units, 100% all sales in the country, in 2017, 
there were 624,077 units of vehicles manufactured in Mexico sold within the country. Domes-
tic sales of domestic production grew 84% in the 29-year period. Exports grew, in the 30 years 
from 1988 to 2018, 20 times, to 3.4 million units in this last year. 












Figure 8. Destination of production (units) of light vehicles in Mexico 
domestic sales - exports 
 
Source: AMIA (ww3.amia.com.mx/archivos/1218.zip) 2018. 
The development of auto industry in Mexico follows the guidelines dictated by the market 
strategies of global companies, whose main interest is to have a convenient location to produce 
goods to be exported to the United States. This explains why the demand in Mexico's market - 
very different from the demand in the US - is satisfied with imports in a growing proportion 
and production for internal market is stagnant, despite the powerful growth of export bound 
production. 
Figure 9. Consumption of light vehicles in Mexico 
domestic production - imports 
 
Source: AMIA (ww3.amia.com.mx/archivos/1218.zip) 2018. 
As figure 9 shows, there has been a slight growth in the sales of vehicles produced in Mexico; 








































































































































































































































































manufactured in Mexico imports
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Figure 10. Manufacture of transportation equipment (automotive industry) and foreign direct investment 
in Mexico 
  
Figure 11. Foreign Direct Investment in automotive industry 
(above the columns the percentage of total IED in automotive industry) 
millions of dollars 
   
Source: Secretaría De Economía. Comisión Nacional De Inversiones Extranjeras 
https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/442866/Informe_Congreso-2018-4T.pdf 
The comparison of the development of automotive industry GDP and foreign direct invest-
ment - figures 10 and 11 - reveals the reasons of the powerful growth of the automotive in-
dustry in Mexico. Mainly after the 2008 crisis, the growth of foreign investment in this indus-



















































































































































































Table 9 – Light vehicles and vehicles: production, exports and imports in Mexico  












 units units 






% of total 
production units 
% share of im-
port out of total 
sales 
1988 505,202 339,132 67.10% 172,603 34.20% 339,132 67.10% 0 0.00% 
1989 629,230 426,507 67.80% 195,994 31.10% 426,507 67.80% 0 0.00% 
1990 803,691 523,112 65.10% 276,859 34.40% 519,463 64.60% 3,649 0.70% 
1991 960,883 610,486 63.50% 358,661 37.30% 601,065 62.60% 9,421 1.50% 
1992 1,051,179 654,790 62.30% 388,739 37.00% 646,307 61.50% 8,483 1.30% 
1993 1,055,221 579,155 54.90% 471,483 44.70% 569,920 54.00% 9,235 1.60% 
1994 1,097,381 593,292 54.10% 567,107 51.70% 524,500 47.80% 68,792 11.60% 
1995 931,178 226,545 24.30% 781,082 83.90% 191,029 20.50% 35,516 15.70% 
1996 1,211,297 325,365 26.90% 975,408 80.50% 245,140 20.20% 80,225 24.70% 
1997 1,338,002 482,238 36.00% 982,952 73.50% 346,527 25.90% 135,711 28.10% 
1998 1,427,590 644,126 45.10% 971,979 68.10% 447,920 31.40% 196,206 30.50% 
1999 1,493,666 667,288 44.70% 1,073,529 71.90% 421,595 28.20% 245,693 36.80% 
2000 1,889,486 853,775 45.20% 1,434,110 75.90% 451,108 23.90% 402,666 47.20% 
2001 1,817,867 918,835 50.50% 1,403,715 77.20% 445,852 24.50% 472,982 51.50% 
2002 1,772,169 977,555 55.20% 1,312,040 74.00% 439,447 24.80% 538,108 55.00% 
2003 1,540,565 977,870 63.50% 1,170,121 76.00% 386,799 25.10% 591,071 60.40% 
2004 1,507,175 1,095,796 72.70% 1,094,306 72.60% 415,614 27.60% 680,182 62.10% 
2005 1,606,460 1,131,768 70.50% 1,186,346 73.80% 406,216 25.30% 725,552 64.10% 
2006 1,978,771 1,139,718 57.60% 1,536,777 77.70% 415,293 21.00% 724,425 63.60% 
2007 2,022,241 1,099,866 54.40% 1,613,313 79.80% 400,820 19.80% 699,046 63.60% 
2008 2,102,801 1,025,520 48.80% 1,661,406 79.00% 414,253 19.70% 611,267 59.60% 
2009 1,507,527 754,918 50.10% 1,223,333 81.10% 324,213 21.50% 430,705 57.10% 
2010 2,260,774 820,406 36.30% 1,859,517 82.30% 374,646 16.60% 445,760 54.30% 
2011 2,557,550 905,886 35.40% 2,143,884 83.80% 432,572 16.90% 473,314 52.20% 
2012 2,884,869 987,747 34.20% 2,355,564 81.70% 466,108 16.20% 521,639 52.80% 
2013 2,933,465 1,063,363 36.20% 2,423,084 82.60% 520,892 17.80% 542,471 51.00% 
2014 3,219,786 1,135,409 35.30% 2,642,887 82.10% 534,795 16.60% 600,614 52.90% 
2015 3,399,076 1,351,648 39.80% 2,758,896 81.20% 630,935 18.60% 720,713 53.30% 
2016 3,465,615 1,603,672 46.30% 2,768,268 79.90% 716,896 20.70% 886,776 55.30% 
2017 3,932,119 1,530,317 38.90% 3,253,385 82.70% 624,077 15.90% 906,240 59.20% 
2018 3,908,139 1,421,458 36.7% 3,449,201 88.26%     
Source: AMIA, 2018 
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Employment and wages 
Employment in the automotive industry in Mexico grew 54.3% between 2013 and 2019 while 
the production of light vehicles grew 35.5% in terms of units, and the GDP of the automotive 
industry grew 42%. Employment in the assembly of vehicles represented approximately 7% of 
the total employment in the automotive industry in Mexico, during the same period, employ-
ment in the auto parts industry represented 82%. In terms of GDP, in 2018, car and truck man-
ufacture represented 49% of the overall GDP of automotive industry, and auto parts manufac-
ture represented 41%. 
Table 10. Employment number of persons 








2013/01        3,596,791            689,056          46,963         566,140  
2013/12        3,707,500            743,198          44,637         614,292  
2014/12        3,839,761            811,191          57,001         663,918  
2015/12        3,940,492            866,819          61,151         712,068  
2016/12        4,066,171            900,869          64,072         746,329  
2017/12        4,207,426            983,235          75,226         810,464  
2018/12        4,319,584         1,048,461          74,945         862,051  
2019/01        4,349,220         1,049,756          74,864         862,910  
2019/02        4,365,073         1,052,664          74,355         863,042  
2019/03        4,371,372         1,063,453          74,023         872,187  
Total growth 
21.5% 54.3% 57.6% 54.1% 
Source: Encuesta mensual de la industria manufacturera (EMIM). Base 2013 
In figure 11 we show the relation between total employment in automotive industry and its 
composition as to white-collar and blue-collar employees. It is evident that most of the growth 












Source: INEGI. Encuesta Mensual de la Industria Manufacturera, 2018. 
Wages in components firms are very diverse. In a research conducted by Juan Manuel 
Hernández Vázquez, Sociology Departament, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, the sam-
ple used showed an average wage of 4,333 pesos at 2010 value, while the contract average 
varied from $2,000 up to almost $6,000. 
Table 11 - Wages in component firms, in constant pesos 2010 value and average purchase power dollars 
Monthly wages of workers in auto parts plants 
selected firms 
company place date  Product PPP dollars 
Servicios de Acoustical Solutions Guanajuato 2016 isolating materials 782 
Lear Consorcio Industrial Mexicano 
de autopartes 
Coahuila 2016 seats 765 
Benteler de México Sonora 2015 steering and 
suspension 
759 
Fraenkische Industrial Pipes Guanajuato 2013 pipes 662 
Plastic Omnium Guanajuato 2015 plastic parts 638 
Plastic Omnium México 2016 plastic parts 624 
Denso Air Systems Coahuila 2013 AC systems 506 
AAm Manufactura Mexico Guanajuato 2015 axes 486 
HBPO México Puebla 2015 lights 375 
Arneses eléctricos automotrices Guanajuato 2016 harnesses 371 
Arneses y conexiones Guanajuato 2015 harnesses 282 
Source: Hernández Vázquez (2017). Wages averaged US$ 1,000 PPP and contractual averages between $700 and 
$1,2000 US PPP. 
Automotive production by state 
In 2018, nearly 90% of the production of parts and components is concentrated in ten states, as 
well as almost 78% of employment.  
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Figure 13 - Main states producing automobiles and trucks (percentage of total production value) 
 
Source: INEGI-AMIA, 2018 
Figure 14 - Main states producing parts and components (percentage of total production value) 
 
Source: INEGI-AMIA, 2018 
Figure 15 - Comparison by state between automobiles and trucks vs. parts and components manufacturing. 




Cars & trucks 
Source: INEGI-AMIA, 2018 
Comparing the percentage of cars and trucks vs. components production in each state makes 
the differences in industrial integration evident. There are also very different conditions of 
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productivity among the different stages of automotive production: while the manufacture of 
automobiles and light and heavy-duty trucks represents only 2.7% of all the economic entities 
in the industry, they employ 10.3 of personnel and manufacture 54.9% of gross production. 
The manufacturing of components has been the activity leading in employment generation: 
nearly 9 out of 10 persons employed in automotive industry were employed by this sector in 
2017. 
Specializations of suppliers in the automotive supply chain 
Using the information on 902 companies listed in the “Automotive Supplier Directory in Mex-
ico”5, it is possible to outline a more detailed view, across the states, of the specializations of 




5 “Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), ProMéxico and 
the state governments of Guanajuato, Nuevo Leon, Queretaro, have developed the Automotive Supplier Direc-
tory in Mexico in order to link the TIER 2 AND TIER 3 suppliers to the Japanese automakers.” https://automo-
tive.promexico.gob.mx/suppliers/#65dee3c7-ac44-4865-974c-5c6a3d275117  
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Table 12 – Gross production in the automotive industry in Mexico, by trade and state, 2004, 2009 and 2014 
  
GROSS PRODUCTION 
Million pesos  
GROSS PRODUCTION 







































2004 486,623 262,285  5,871   212,628    43,118   23,240   520   18,840  
2009 774,081 396,825  15,420   340,663    57,307   29,378   1,142   25,220  
2014 1,496,045 800,191  23,520   626,365    112,437   60,139   1,768   47,075  
Aguasca-
lientes 
2004 23,855 -  65   8,120    2,114   -   6   719  
2009 57,167 33,985  213   22,967    4,232   2,516   16   1,700  
2014 96,234   166   41,576    7,233    12   3,125  
Guana 
juato 
2004 66,770 n.a.  n.a.   10,893    5,916   n.a.   n.a.   965  
2009 56,562 n.a.  1,699   14,778    4,187   n.a.   126   1,094  
2014 127,293 n.a.  1,454   41,576    9,567   n.a.   109   3,125  
Nuevo Leon 
2004 29,280 n.a.  650   21,889    2,594   n.a.   58   1,939  
2009 47,375 n.a.  2,999   40,122    3,507   n.a.   266   3,555  
2014 147,353 68,613  4,562   71,611    11,075   6,080   404   6,345  
State of 
Mexico 
2004 60,659 36,558  1,999   22,002    5,375   3,239   177   1,950  
2009 92,107 48,091  5,082   38,278    6,819   3,560   450   3,392  
2014 158,798 n.a.  5,182   48,930    11,935   n.a.   459   4,336  
Puebla 
2004 71,960 n.a.  48   20,894    6,376   n.a.   4   1,851  
2009 115,453 n.a.  378   28,254    8,547   n.a.   33   2,503  
2014 176,448 108,494  1,017   66,898    13,261   8,154   90   5,928  
Coahuila 
2004 95,235 n.a.  0   25,442    8,438   n.a.   0   2,254  
2009 137,780 n.a.  1,831   53,211    10,200   n.a.   162   4,715  
2014 251,262 n.a.  3,904   113,146    18,884   n.a.   346   10,025  
Sonora 
2004 12,328 9,499  n.a.   2,761    1,092   842   n.a.   245  
2009 56,284 n.a.  54   12,223    4,167   n.a.   5   1,083  
2014 159,548 n.a.  68   26,912    11,991   n.a.   6   2,385  
Querétaro 
2004 18,995 n.a.  131   18,864    1,683   n.a.   12   1,672  
2009 32,006 n.a.  248   29,205    2,836   n.a.   22   2,588  
2014 55,662 n.a.  378   50,024    4,932   n.a.   34   4,432  
* converted to U.S.$ by annual average of fix rate of exchange - www.banxico.org.mx  
** Law for the National System of Statistical and Geographic Information, article 38: The data and reports that 
the informants of the system provide for statistical ends ... should be managed observing the principles of confi-
dentiality and reserve and may not be made public in any case in a nominative and individualised form. As a 
consequence, there is no information (n.a.) in the cases where there is only one economic unit. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data from INEGI NAS. www.inegi.org.mx 
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raw material Raw Material 1   1    13     4  2 1   1     23 
rubber parts Rubber parts 1    1  2 4  1   5  3         17 
metallic parts Screws and nuts     1   1 3  1   2  2 2        12 
casting  
and forging 
Casting 2 1 3 2 5 3 6 6  4   19 3 3 4   1     62 
Die Casting   1 1   3 6     6 2 8         27 
Cold Forging   1 1 2  1 2 1 1   4 4 8         25 
Hot Forging       3      1 1 1         6 
forming  
Metal Stamping 9 6 4 20 18 2 18 10 5 11   46 3 50 10 1 5 2     220 
Plastic Injection  
Moulding 1 4 1 3 2 2 8 16 3 1  4 16 7 35 3 1  4     111 
wire 
Wire Form (Springs)     1  1 5     2  5         14 
Wire Harness  2     1 3     2  2         10 
tubing Tubing 1   3   1  1    2  2 3        13 
textile Textile       1 3       2    2     8 
machining and 
tooling 
Machining  5 1 2 9 1 13 16 1 2   31 2 36 7 1 1 2 1 1   132 
Tooling (Dies and 
moulds) 1 1   1  2      4 1 11 2        23 
other       2 1                3 
coating and 
treatment 
Coating and surface  
finishing  2 1 4 1  5 5  2   9  11 3  2      45 
Heat Treatment       3 5       5         13 
na  1 3 1 5 9  6 21 1 4 1  49 5 18 7 2 1 1   1 2 138 
Total  17 24 13 43 49 8 77 119 12 27 1 4 202 28 204 42 5 9 13 1 1 1 2 902 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data from Automotive Supplier Directory in Mexico, download 10/09/2018 
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